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I. CORPORATE LAW
A. New Legislation
The 1975 session of the Florida legislature produced a com-
pletely revised General Corporation Act.' The new act, which is
based on the Model Business Corporation Act,' takes effect on
* The survey period includes legislation during the 1974 and 1975 sessions of Ihe Florida
legislature and judicial decisions reported from 288 So. 2d through 310 So. 2d, 488 F.2d
through 511 F.2d and 368 F. Supp. through 390 F. Supp.
** Member of the Florida Bar; Former Articles & Comments Editor, LlniversitY of
Miami Law Review.
1. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-250, creating FLA. STAT. ch. 607 (1975).
2. Not only did the drafters of the new act rely to a large extent on the model act, but
in many instances they adopted its provisions verbatim. This should be of substantial benefit
to Florida practitioners since many questions which will arise under the new act have been
decided in other jurisdictions. See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED (2d ed. 1971).
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January 1, 1976. Under the new act, the special provisions under the
prior law dealing with closely-held corporations :' and foreign corpo-
rations' have been integrated into the general act. While the new act
provides a complete, logically organized, modern corporation act,
there have been few substantive changes from prior Florida law. '
B. Recent Decisions
1. SALE OF ASSETS
Unless there exists a statute providing otherwise, a bona fide
purchaser of corporate assets does not assume the debts of the sell-
ing corporation in the absence of fraud or an agreement to assume
those debts.' This principle of law was the focal point of litigation
in Sens v. Slavia, Inc.,' when both the successor in interst of the
corporation and that corporation's unsecured creditors claimed a
substantial amount of money. In Sens, a corporation, owning prop-
erty in Miami Beach on which a hotel was located, defaulted on its
mortgage payments and the holders of the first, second and third
mortgages brought a foreclosure action. Prior to the entry of the
foreclosure decree, Sens purchased the property from the corpora-
tion. Then to protect his title, he made the highest bid at the court-
ordered foreclosure sale. Sens' bid was approximately $66,000 higher
than the actual mortgages, so that a surplus fund was created. This
surplus fund was claimed by both Sens, as the holder of the equity
of redemption, and by the tenants of the hotel who desired a refund
of advance rents given to the original corporation. Although the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the trial court's
refusal to refund the surplus funds to Sens on equitable grounds,'
the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding that the mere ac-
quisition of property from a corporation generally does not make the
buyer liable for the corporation's debts to unsecured creditors.
The court weighed the conflicting claims of the purchaser of
3. FLA. STAT. ch. 608, pt. 11 (1973).
4. FLA. STAT. ch. 613 (1973).
5. For a comparison of the old and new acts, see THE FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION, BASIC PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW FLORIDA CORPORATION LAW (1975). See also THE
FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE (to be published in
1976).
6. East Coast Stores v. Cuthbert, 101 Fla. 25, 133 So. 863 (1931); 7FLA. JUR. Corpora-
tions § 343 (1956); cf. Casements, Inc. v. Ruscoe, 85 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1956).
7. 304 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1974).
8. Sens v. Slavia, Inc., 292 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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assets from a virtually defunct corporation against those of unse-
cured creditors and reached the most equitable result. The court,
noting that Sens acquired title subject to the claims of vested credi-
tors, nevertheless refused to extend his liability to the tenants, who
were unsecured creditors. The court's determination is consistent
with past decisions9 and properly protects bona fide purchasers of
corporate assets from claims of unsecured creditors.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a corporation has both
express and implied powers to transfer its property and assets, sub-
ject to limitations imposed by various statutory provisions and pub-
lic policy considerations.'" As a result of these powers, there is a
presumption that a sale of corporate property or assets is made in
good faith and in the best interests of the stockholders.",
These rules of law were applied by the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, in De La Rosa v. Tropical Sandwiches, Inc. 2 After
concluding that the sale of a restaurant is not subject to the Florida
Bulk Transfer Act,' 3 the court found that a purchaser of corporate
assets who did not assume the obligation attached to the stock of
the vendor was a bona fide purchaser under Florida Statutes section
672.403 (1973) and therefore obtained good title to the property.
Although the court in De La Rosa did not expressly so state, it seems
that the determinative issue was whether the purchaser acted in
good faith so as to come within the protection of Florida Statutes
section 679.307 (1973). Since a corporation in Florida is empowered
to sell all of its assets, and since a purchaser who does not expressly
assume any indebtedness attached to a corporate asset is not liable
thereon, the purchaser in De La Rosa was entitled to believe that
his vendor had the legal authority to sell the assets in question and
therefore acted in good faith.
9. Meyer v. Bricklayers Local 7, 144 Fla. 401, 198 So. 78 (1940); Rosen v. Dorn-Kothe,
126 Fla. 717, 171 So. 646 (1936). See also Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 85 Nev. 276, 454 P.2d 24
(1969).
10. 6A W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2925 (perm. ed. rev. 1968); H. HENN, LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 341 (2d ed. 1970); FLA. STAT. § 608.19(1) (1973); Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-
250, § 80, creating FLA. STAT. § 607.241 (1975).
11. De La Rosa v. Tropical Sandwiches, Inc., 298 So. 2d 471, 472 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974),
citing Baron v. Pressed Metals, 35 Del. Ch. 325, 117 A.2d 357 (1955).
12. 298 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), noted in 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 597 (1975).
13. FLA. STAT. ch. 676 (1973). However, after the De La Rosa decision was handed down,
the Florida legislature amended the Bulk Sales Act to include specifically the sale of restaur-
ant assets. See Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-216, amending FLA. STAT. § 676.102(3) (1973).
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2. RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS
The basic scheme for dividend distribution is that all share-
holders participate ratably except as otherwise provided in the arti-
cles of incorporation. The usual practice where dividends are not to
be shared ratably is to give to one or more classes of shares desig-
nated "preferred shares," a dividend preference over another class
or classes.'" Florida statutory law expressly allows a corporation to
use this preferential distributive scheme as long as it is so provided
in the articles of incorporation.' 5 Whether, absent such a provision,
shareholders of a corporation could contract among themselves to
agree upon a preferential distributive scheme was not clear, and
thereby created a case of first impression when that issue was raised
in Little v. Caswell-Doyle-Jones Corp. " In this case, a Subchapter
S corporation 7 was established by ten shareholders in order to con-
struct and sell a large condominium project. Eight of these share-
holders lent substantial amounts of money to the corporation, which
served as the major source of equity financing for the project, and
the individual defendants signed each note as personal guarantors
of the corporation. The shareholders voluntarily signed a stockhold-
ers agreement in which the undivided profits of the corporation,
after the payment of construction costs, would be distributed on a
proportionate basis, except that the shareholder-lenders would be
entitled to advance distributions roughly equal to half of the
amount of their loans.'I
The assignee of two of these loans brought suit against the
corporation and the individual guarantors after the condominium
project failed. The defendants attempted to avoid payment of the
principal and interest on these loans by asserting that the loans were
usurious and hence unenforceable. It was claimed by the defendants
that the shareholders' agreement was a device calculated to give an
incentive to the shareholders to lend money to the corporation while
obtaining a preferential claim to dividends without losing the corpo-
14. H. HENN, supra note 10, § 324.
15. FLA. SrAT. § 608.14 (1973). See also Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-250, § 15, creating FI.A.
SIA'r. § 607.044 (1975).
16. 305 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
17. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-79.
18. It is not clear from the opinion whether all the shareholders signed the shareholders'
agreement. The court's holding expressly does not "consider or comment as to the propriety
of those not bound by the agreement challenging the financial structure" of the corporation.
305 So. 2d at 845.
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ration's Subchapter S status. The defendants maintained that any
monies derived as dividends as a result of the agreement would, in
effect, be additional interest on the loans and would therefore push
the effective interest rate above the legal limit.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, rejected the defen-
dants' contentions and found that stockholders of a corporation may
unanimously agree to preferential distribution of corporate profits.
The court based its decision on the freedom given to citizens to
contract with other citizens of full age and competent understand-
ing.2" It reasoned that the agreement was voluntarily entered into
between the individual stockholders, so that there was no fixed duty
on either the corporation as an entity or the guarantors to pay an
interest over the 6 percent stated in the loans being litigated. The
court downplayed the shareholders' attempt to evade the spirit, if
not the letter, of provisions in Subchapter S, stating that "[tlhe
law of this jurisdiction as to corporate structure is not amended or
engrafted upon by the intricacies of tax advantages or disadvan-
tages of the Federal Internal Revenue Code."'"
The decision in Little does not seem justified in letting stand
an agreement which undercuts much of the spirit, if not the letter,
of Florida statutory law. Florida Statutes section 608.14 (1973) ex-
pressly states that "[e]very corporation may issue the shares of
stock authorized by its certificate of incorporation and none
other."2 Little permitted the members of a corporation to create a
new class of stock, i.e., preferred, without seeking an amendment
of the corporation's articles of incorporation. Although not bound by
the Internal Revenue Code when considering Florida corporate law,
the court should have realized that its decision permitted the avoid-
ance of Florida, not federal, law.
3. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
One of the haziest areas of corporate law is the determination
of whether a corporation acts as an entity, i.e., a separate person,
19. A corporation can only qualify for Subchapter S treatment if, among other require-
ments, it has only one class of stock. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(4).
20. See, e.g., Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong, 300 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1974); State
v. Tobasso Homes, Inc., 3 Terry 110, 28 A.2d 248 (Del. 1942).
21. 305 So. 2d at 844.
22. Emphasis added. But see Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-250, § 15, creating FIA. SrAr. §
607.044 (1975), which does not contain this express limitation.
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or as an aggregate of its individual shareholders.2' If the corporation
is found to act as an entity unto itself, its shareholders are not
personally liable for its actions. However, if the fictional corporate
veil is pierced by a finding that the organization is a sham, the
individual stockholders will be personally liable.24 The pertinent
decisions in the survey period dealt with questions of loans to corpo-
rations and the parent/subsidiary relationship.
a. Loans to Corporations
Florida's usury law permits a lender to charge 10 percent inter-
est on loans to individuals and 15 percent interest on loans to corpo-
rations.25 An extremely crucial legal question is therefore whether a
loan to a corporation, established for the purposes of charging more
than a 10 percent interest rate, guaranteed by individuals who re-
ceive an economic benefit therefrom, is a loan to the corporate ent-
ity or to the individual guarantors. The interest charged on loans
which have an interest rate in excess of 10 percent will be forfeited
if the corporate veil is pierced by a court holding that the loan was,
in reality, made to a group of individuals.2" The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit restated several settled principles
of Florida law and approved a set of jury instructions concerning the
above issue in Securities Investment Co. v. Indian Waters Develop-
ment Corp.27 The facts in Indian Waters were the same as those
posed above, with an effective interest rate charged on the loan of
10.85 percent. Although the court pointed out that Florida does not
permit its usury law to be evaded by the creation of a sham corpora-
tion to disguise a loan to an individual,2" it did cite a prior case2"
which held that a corporation formed for the sole purpose of borrow-
ing money at an interest rate higher than 10 percent is not, without
more, grounds for holding the loan usurious. Indian Waters makes
clear that whether such a loan is a sham is a factual question to be
23. For a general discussion of the federal income tax implications of the entity/aggregate
approach, see J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 217 (2d ed. 1973); H. HENN, supra
note 10, § 16.
24. 9 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4231 (perm. ed. rev. 1964); H. HENN, supra
note 10, § 146.
25. FLA. STAT. § 687.02 (1973).
26. See FLA. STAT. § 687.04 (1973).
27. 501 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1974).
28. Gilbert v. Doris R. Corp., 111 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
29. Holland v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1956).
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Florida courts have repeatedly held that the corporate veil will
not be penetrated either at law or in equity unless it is shown that
the corporation was organized or employed to mislead creditors or
to work a fraud on them. Moreover, the fact that a parent corpora-
tion owns all of the stock of a subsidiary does not, in and of itself,
constitute abuse of the corporate entity privilege.:" The Supreme
Court of Florida has found such abuse of the entity privilege in cases
where the purpose is to evade some statute or to accomplish some
fraud or illegal purpose,32 and in cases where the corporation is
either a mere device to accomplish some ulterior purpose or a mere
instrumentality or agent of another corporation or individual own-
ing all or most of its stock.3
The issue of whether a subsidiary corporation was a mere in-
strumentality of its parent was raised in Gladding Corp. v.
Register." In Gladding, the parent corporation ("Gladding") cre-
ated a subsidiary for the exclusive purpose of purchasing Register's
wholly owned corporation, Outdoor Sporting Goods Co. ("Out-
door"). The sales contract referred to Outdoor as the seller, Register
as the shareholder, and the subsidiary as the buyer. The contract
also recited that "Gladding desires to so acquire said assets" and
that "Gladding agrees . . . to cause the Buyer to purchase and to
accept transfer . . . ."I After Register presented a statement of
previously undisclosed debts, it was "Gladding . . . [which]
30. The court in Indian Waters approved instructions to the jury which allowed consider.
ation of the following factors: (1) whether there had been active stockholder and/or director
meetings; (2) whether the corporation had ever engaged in any form of business prior to the
time the loan in issue was made; (3) whether the corporation engaged in any form of business
after the loan was made; (4) whether the corporation has any employees; (5) whether the
corporation had an active checking account; (6) whether the proceeds of the loan were used
for the corporation's business or that of the individual defendants; (7) whether the corpora-
tion paid any real estate taxes; and (8) whether the corporation filed any income tax returns.
501 F.2d at 666 n.5. Since the jury was properly instructed in Indian Waters, its findings that
the corporation was not a sham and that the loan was not usurious were affirmed.
31. Sowards, Corporations, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 342-43 (1967).
32. Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State, 251 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1971). See Bell & Goodman,
Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 922, 928 (1974).
33. Levenstein v. Sapiro, 279 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1973).
34. 293 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
35. Id. at 731 (court's emphasis).
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manage[d] to negotiate a reduced price . . . .":" Subsequent to the
sale of Outdoor to Gladding's subsidiary, the parties became entan-
gled in a dispute and Register brought an action against both Glad-
ding and its wholly owned subsidiary, claiming a breach of the
above-mentioned sales contract.
The court in Gladding reversed the lower court's ruling that
Gladding was liable under the sales contract. The court conceded
that the subsidiary was established for the sole purpose of consum-
mating the sale, acquiring the assets of Outdoor and insulating
Gladding from personal liability, and that the negotiations culmi-
nating in the acquisition were conducted solely by Gladding. Never-
theless, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, decided that
the subsidiary was not the alter ego of Gladding and that the word-
ing of the sales contract was not sufficient to consider Gladding to
be a guarantor of the subsidiary.
The decision in Gladding seems to contradict completely a
prior decision of the Supreme Court of Florida. Although it is not
disputed that a parent corporation which is not the alter ego of its
subsidiary cannot be held liable for the contracts of its subsidiary, :'7
the District Court of Appeal ignored the principle established in
Levenstein v. Sapiro5 that the determination of the entity privilege
is primarily a factual one to be decided by the trier of fact. The
Supreme Court of Florida in that case stated:
We do not believe the rule of limited individual liability is so
pervasive and absolute as to preclude a trial judge from . . .
having a factual determination made in a proper case as to
whether an individual rather than his wholly owned corporation
is liable. :"'
That the Gladding case is a proper one for such a factual determina-
tion is evident from the terms in the sales contract which specify
that Gladding, not its subsidiary, was to acquire the assets of Out-
door, and by Gladding's negotiation of the terms of sale. Although
a trier of fact might agree with the Third District's findings, it was
not the function of the appellate court to so decide.
36. Id..
:37. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Harrell Int'l, Inc., 299 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
38. 279 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1973).
39. Id. at 860.
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4. JURISDICTION
The landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington"'
established that states could obtain in personam jurisdiction over
nonresident corporations and individuals as long as there existed
certain minimum contacts with the state "such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."'"
Florida Statutes section 48.181 (1973), Florida's principal long-
arm statute, provides for substituted service upon the Secretary of
State for all nonresidents doing business in the state.42 Disputes in
this area of the law principally center around the meaning of "doing
business" in Florida. The cases involving construction of this stat-
ute during the survey period illustrate that each case must be re-
solved on the basis of its particular facts.
The court concluded in Babson Brothers Co. v. Allison"' that
the defendant corporation fell within the jurisdictional reach of sec-
tion 48.181 because one of its sales representatives had spent three
months in a Florida office taking orders and selling its products,
other of its sales representatives had actively sold its products to
Florida customers, and the plaintiff had been required by the defen-
dant to keep books and records on dealership sales. Similarly, a
nonresident corporate manufacturer was found to have established
the requisite minimum contacts with Florida in Dublin Co. v. Pen-
insular Supply Co.44 since it sold its products to distributors in
Florida for at least five years and thereby grossed at least $13,000
per year.
Jurisdiction over foreign corporations pursuant to section
48.181 was found lacking in two cases during the survey period. In
Crown Colony Club, Ltd. v. Honecker,4 ' the defendant resort opera-
tor, although not qualified to do business in Florida, had contracted
with a Miami concern to provide numerous services for the defen-
dant. " The plaintiff in Crown Colony brought an action based upon
40. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
41. Id. at 316. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
42. For a discussion of this statute, see Note, In Personam Jurisdiction-Due Process
and Florida's Short "Long-Arm", 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 336 (1971).
43. 298 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
44. 309 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
45. 307 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
46. The Miami concern, among other things, (1) made reservations; (2) handled corre-
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LA W REVIEW
defendant's negligent maintenance of an airstrip located in the Ba-
hamas. The court denied jurisdiction under section 48.181 on the
basis of the established rule that to invoke this section, it must be
shown that the cause of action arose out of a transaction or opera-
tion connected with or incidental to the activities of the foreign
corporation in Florida.47 Jurisdiction over the defendant was ob-
tained, however, under another long-arm statute, which provides for
service upon a foreign corporation's business agent within Florida."
The rule that section 48.181 may be utilized only when the suit
arises out of the defendant's activities or business in Florida was
also applied in American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski4 ' when it
was determined that the corporate defendant was not doing busi-
ness in Florida at the time of the incident giving rise to the cause
of action, even though it had thereafter commenced doing business
in the state, before the suit was filed.'"
5. VENUE
Florida's venue statute' governing actions against corporations
provides a plaintiff with multiple venue choices. A plaintiff suing a
foreign corporation under this statute can bring an action in the
county where such corporation has an agent, where the cause of
action accured or where the property in litigation is located. When
the plaintiff in Mann v. Goodyear Fire & Rubber Co."2 was struck
spondence; (3) coordinated the placing of orders with suppliers; (4) contacted workmen and
arranged for their transportation to defendant's place of business in the Bahamas; and (5)
had fastened to the outside wall of the office a sign which read "Crown Colony Club."
Defendant also listed the address of the Miami concern as one of its two Miami mailing
addresses.
47. Lyster v. Round, 276 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). In addition, the burden of proof
to sustain the validity of service of process is upon the person who seeks to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court. Failure to meet this burden will render service on an agent invalid
and ineffective. Pan Americana Television Los Angeles, Inc. v. Latin Media Consultants
Corp., 300 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
48. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(5) (1973). After examining the services detailed in note 46 supra,
one can understand the court's determination that the Miami concern acted as defendant
corporation's business agent.
49. 308 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975). This opinion is expertly written and researched
and provides an excellent source of material for research into the jurisdictional aspects of
Florida corporate law.
50. In addition, the court in American Baseball held that defendant corporation was not
susceptible to service under FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (1971), repealed by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-
179, § 2, because, among other reasons, the cause of action accrued before the effective date
of that statute.
51. FLA. STAT. § 47.051 (1973).
52. 300 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1974).
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by a vehicle owned and operated by defendant corporation in Hills-
borough County, he chose to bring suit in Dade County. The defen-
dant made a motion to transfer the action to Hillsborough County
under the Florida forum non conveniens statute, Florida Statutes
section 47.122 (1973), claiming that it resided there and that all of
the witnesses and participants also resided there. Plaintiff, in turn,
invoked Florida Statutes section 47.163 (1973), which provides that
no change of venue shall be made to any county where either of the
parties resides without their consent. The trial court's denial of the
defendant's motion was reversed by the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, on the grounds that the forum non conveniens stat-
ute, having been enacted by the legislature at a later date, took
precedence over the earlier statute. 3
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, reversed the Third
District's decision on the basis of the well-settled rule that where
two statutes operate on the same subject without positive inconsis-
tency or repugnancy, courts must construe them so as to preserve
the force of both without destroying their evident intent, if possi-
ble. 4 The court stated that
absent the necessary clear intention to repeal, the later discre-
tionary general statute [section 47.122] is presumed to have
made an exception to the prior specific, mandatory statute
[section 47.1631 which prohibits transfer of a case to the resi-
dence of either of the parties without their consent.7, 
A literal interpretation of this sentence indicates that section
47.163 can be defeated whenever a trial court, in its discretion,
decides to apply the forum non conveniens statute. The Supreme
Court of Florida concluded, however:
When suing a foreign corporation, one has the right to bring one's
action anywhere business is transacted in Florida subject to the
forum non conveniens statute and further limited by the provi-
sions of Section 47.163, Florida Statutes, requiring the consent of
the parties."
53. Mann v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 285 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), rev 'd, 300
So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1974). The District Court, in effect, nullified FLA. STAT. § 47.163 (1973).
54. E.g., Florida Jai Alai, Inc. v. Lake Howell Water & Reclamation Dist., 274 So. 2d
522 (Fla. 1973); Ellis v. City of Winter Haven, 60 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1952); cf. Howarth v. City
of DeLand, 117 Fla. 692, 158 So. 294 (1934).
55. 300 So. 2d at 668.
56. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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The court's decision to uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to change venue finds additional support as a result of an
amendment 7 to section 47.163 in 1973, which makes that section
controlling as the last expression of the legislative will. Thus, de-
fendants in actions against foreign corporations in Florida cannot
obtain a change of venue to the county where either of the parties
resides without the consent of the plaintiff.
6. ABILITY TO SUE OR BE SUED
During the survey period, there were two cases which construed
different statutes governing a corporation's ability to bring or de-
fend an action.
When a corporation required by law to pay a tax on its net
income fails to file its annual report with the Department of State
and to pay the annual filing fee by July 1 of each year, the corpora-
tion will not be permitted to maintain or defend an action in any
Florida court until such reports are filed and all back taxes are
paid." If a domestic corporation fails to pay the tax for a period of
1 year, the corporation is subject to dissolution."9 In Gilman v.
Altman,"' a corporation which was legally dissolved by the state for
nonpayment of taxes was not allowed to file a counterclaim because
it failed to reinstate itself. The court's imposition of this burden on
a dissolved corporation is clearly justified by the prior case law in
this area."
A foreign nonprofit corporation which does not obtain a permit
from the Department of State to carry out the objects and purposes
of its incorporation in Florida is not permitted to bring or maintain
suit before any court in the state.2 Therefore, when a foreign non-
profit corporation did not obtain such a permit in City of Sunrise
v. Plastics Pipe Institute,3 the court correctly found that the corpo-
ration did not have the capacity to seek an injunction.
57. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-334, § 11.
58. FiA. STAT. § 608.351 (1973). See also Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-250, § 120, creating FLA.
STA'r. § 607.357(6) (1975).
59. FLA. STAT. § 608.36(1) (1973). See also Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-250, § 90, creating FLA.
STAr. § 607.271(2)(a) (1975).
60. 300 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
61. See Marienelli v. Weaver, 208 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
62. FLA. STATr. § 617.11 (1973).
63. 299 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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7. OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
Officers and directors have traditionally owed fiduciary duties
to their corporation and its shareholders. 4 Florida courts have long
sustained this fiduciary duty in view of the fact that the responsibil-
ities of directors and officers towards a corporation are analogous to
those of a trustee toward the beneficiary of a trust. The obligation
is therefore imposed on them to act with fidelity and good faith,
subordinating their personal interests to those of the corporation. 5
The cases involving fiduciary duties in the survey period revolve
around the issues of usurping corporate opportunity, oppression of
minority shareholders and the so-called business judgment rule.
a. Usurping Corporate Opportunity
It is a cardinal principle that officers and directors of a corpora-
tion may not divert to themselves the opportunities which in equity
and fairness belong to the corporation." While it is true that corpo-
rate officers and directors are not precluded from entering into an-
other similar enterprise separate from the corporation, they must
refrain from interfering with the business of the corporation and
must act in good faith. 7 The central question is thus whether the
opportunity is a corporate one or one within the legitimate scope of
the individual interests of the officer or director.
In Independent Optical Co. v. Elmore," it was alleged by a
corporation and its majority shareholder that defendants, former
employees who were directors of the corporation at all times perti-
nent to the complaint, induced all of the corporation's employees to
leave and to work for defendants, unlawfully transferred the corpo-
ration's property to themselves, worked under plaintiff's trade name
while billing under defendant's name and, finally, used assets,
equipment, facilities and goodwill of plaintiff corporation in pro-
moting the business of defendant. Finding that the allegations in
64. II W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5135.1 (perm. ed. rev. 1971); H. HENN supra
note 10, § 235.
65. Gould v. Brick, 358 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1966); Garner v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 580
(M.D. Fla. 1973); Flight Equip. & Eng'r Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1958); Ether-
edge v. Barrow, 102 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
66. H. HENN, supra note 10, § 237. However, a shareholder's claim of lost corporate
opportunity will be denied when the corporation lacks the financial ability to take advantage
of it. Hardwicke Cos. v. Freed, 299 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
67. Renpack, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
68. 289 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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the complaint of the defendants' intentional efforts to destroy the
plaintiff's business sufficiently stated a cause of action for breach
of a director's fiduciary duty," the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.
b. Oppression of Minority Shareholders
It is a generally accepted principle, codified by the Florida
legislature,7"' that when a corporation issues additional capital stock,
shareholders at the time of issuance should have the right, in prefer-
ence to any other persons, to purchase the new stock in proportion
to the number of shares of the original stock held by them.7' This
privilege is called the shareholder's preemptive right, and the pres-
ervation, unimpaired and undiluted, of the old shareholder's rela-
tive and proportionate voting strength and control is the foundation
of that right.
In issuing additional shares, corporate management is, as in the
case of any corporate activity, under a fiduciary duty to take corpo-
rate action according to the best interests of the corporation and not
for personal advantage." Therefore, if directors offer additional
shares to freeze out the current shareholders, regardless of the appli-
cation (and even technical observance) of preemptive rights, the
directors have breached their fiduciary duties.
A breach of directors' fiduciary duties was thus found to have
occurred in Biltmore Motor Corp. v. Rogue74 even though the minor-
ity shareholders' preemptive rights were technically observed. In
Biltmore, the majority shareholders, acting in their capacity as
69. In an interesting concurring opinion, Judge Boardman stated that the complaint
should have been upheld in that it alleged a proper case of interference with existing contrac-
tual relationships. 289 So. 2d at 25.
70. FLA. SWAT. § 608.42(2) (1973). Under this section, a shareholder is presumed to have
this right unless expressly denied by the certificate of incorporation. The corresponding
section in the new general corporation act changes this presumption; a shareholder has no
such right unless expressly provided for in the articles of incorporation. See Fla. Laws 1975,
ch. 75-250, § 26, creating FLA. STAT. § 607.077(1) (1975).
71. 11 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5135 (perm. ed. rev. 1971); H. HENN, supra
note 10, § 173.
72. Rowland v. Times Pub. Co., 35 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1948); Note, Freezing Out Minority
Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (1961).
73. Rowland v. Times Pub. Co., 35 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1948); 11 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5135.1 (perm ed. rev. 1971); H. HENN, supra note 10, § 240.
74. 291 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 303 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1974).
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directors, authorized a new issue of capital stock after they had
pressured the plaintiff minority shareholder to resign from the cor-
poration.7" Plaintiff was given the opportunity to exercise his
preemptive rights but refused to do so. Although the defendants
claimed that this recapitalization was needed to repay loans to
plaintiff's family, the court held that the only apparent purpose for
the new issue of stock was to dilute the plaintiff's interest, and
therefore, the defendants' action constituted an abuse of discretion
and a violation of their fiduciary duties. The Biltmore decision is
eminently justified when it is observed that the defendants used the
recapitalization funds, among other things, to issue dividends and
to excessively increase their salaries. The mere fact that the plaintiff
was afforded an opportunity to acquire additional stock cannot ex-
cuse the defendants' breach of faith because "the individual defen-
dants knew that the plaintiff, having been ousted from the corporate
family, would not invest any more money in the company. ' ' 711 Such
an empty gesture cannot be allowed to relieve directors of the duty
owed to their shareholders.
c. Business Judgment Rule
Although it is undisputed that officers and directors must act
in the best interests of the corporation, were they not immunized
from liability arising from poor business decisions which were made
in good faith, they would be afraid to take any risk even if it was in
the best interests of the corporation. The business judgment rule
was therefore created so that if in the course of management, direc-
tors in good faith arrive at a decision within the corporation's powers
and their authority, for which there is a reasonable basis, a court
will not interfere with internal management and substitute its judg-
ment for that of the directors to enjoin or set aside the transaction
or to surcharge the directors for any resulting loss. 77 Florida has
given wide discretion in the exercise of directors' business judgment
in the performance of their duties.
75. The plaintiff had served as an employee, vice-president and director of the company
for 11 years before his employment was terminated. Thereafter, the defendants attempted to
purchase plaintiff's stock for considerably less than its fair market value. When the plaintiff
refused to accede to defendant's demands, he was pressured to resign from both his officer
and director posts in the corporation.
76. 291 So. 2d at 115.
77. H. HENN, supra note 10, § 242.
78. Yarnall Warehouse & Transfer, Inc. v. Three Ivory Bros. Moving Co., 226 So. 2d 887
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
called upon to review the exercise of managerial discretion in Schein
v. Caesar's World, Inc."5 In this case, plaintiffs alleged in a deriva-
tive action a diminution of corporate assets as a result of the direc-
tors' and officers' failure to exercise a clause in an equipment lease
executed with Centronics Data Computer Corporation."' Simultane-
ously with the execution of this lease, Centronics assigned to Cae-
sar's World an option to purchase a large block of the former's stock,
subject to a right in Centronics to recapture 50 percent of the stock
if the above-mentioned equipment lease were terminated by either
party. As a result of a dramatic rise in the price of Centronics stock,
Caesar's World exercised its option. Unforeseen difficulties arose,
however, so that the equipment in question was never placed into
operation, and Centronics thus exercised its right to recapture one-
half of the stock obtained by Caesar's World through the exercise
of its option. The plaintiffs alleged that the failure of defendants to
fix a rent with Centronics so that its right of recapture would be
eliminated constituted a breach of their fiduciary duty.
The court correctly concluded that the defendants fulfilled
their corporate duties. It was noted that it was incumbent upon the
corporate directors to evaluate the relative risks of alternate courses
of action and that their decision "was undisputedly a sound exercise
of their business judgment which, absent any allegations or showing
of bad faith or fraud, is not judicially reviewable."5 ' The correctness
of the decision is bolstered by the fact that the directors arranged a
compromise as to both corporations' rights under the lease and op-
tion agreements, which resulted in an immediate profit of roughly
$6.7 million on a $1.7 million investment. Caesar's World thus pre-
sented a perfect case for a court to abstain from interfering with the
day-to-day operations of a corporation.
8. DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
The shareholder derivative action involves the assertion by a
shareholder of a corporate cause of action against persons who have
79. 491 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974). It is to be noted that the
appellate court merely affirmed per curiam, attaching a copy of the lower court's memoran-
dum opinion to its opinion.
80. Under the lease, either party had the right to terminate the agreement prior to the
end of a six-month's rent-free period commencing when sufficient equipment and accessories
were installed and operating. Id. at 18.
81. Id. at 20.
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damaged the corporation in situations where, for some reason, the
corporation has failed to enforce the claim directly. 2 It differs from
the individual and class actions which may be brought by share-
holders in that the purpose of the derivative action is to obtain a
judgment in the corporation's favor, whereas individual and class
actions seek to redress damages done to the shareholders as individ-
uals."
In Fried v. Easton4 the chief executive officer of a corporation
filed a suit as a private individual against one of the corporation's
shareholders. The defendant counterclaimed, alleging a breach of
plaintiff-counterdefendant's fiduciary duty to the corporation by his
intention to convert certain corporate assets to his own use and
benefit. As plaintiff's alleged breach of fiduciary duty constituted
an injury to the corporation and not to the defendant individually,
the appellate court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the counter-
claim. Since a suit to recover damages for breach of a director's duty
to his corporation is generally treated as a wrong to the corpora-
tion,"5 a proper result was reached in Fried, especially in light of the
procedural rule that a counterclaim must exist in favor of a defen-
dant in the same right in which he is sued.8"
The threshhold question which must be answered in any suit
is whether the plaintiff has standing to sue, for unless this require-
ment is satisfied, no action can be maintained. The court in Belcher
v. Schilling7 was faced with the issue of whether shareholders who
had not given proxies to the defendants would have standing to sue
on their own behalf for misleading statements made by the defen-
dants in obtaining proxies from other shareholders. The court in
Belcher answered affirmatively because
"it is not important whether or not the complaining stockholders
were deceived-they could suffer equally damaging injury to
their corporate interests merely because other shareholders were
deceived . ".8.."'8
82. H. HENN, supra note 10, § 360.
83. Sowards, Corporations, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 339, 346 (1967).
84. 293 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
85. H. HENN, supra note 10, § 360, at 758-59.
86. Lucas v. Wade, 43 Fla. 419, 31 So. 231 (1901); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v.
Ball, 208 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
87. 309 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
88. Id. at 34, quoting Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 209 (6th Cir.
1961).
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The court clearly arrived at the correct conclusion since the direc-
tors' alleged improper and illegal obtaining of proxies in order to
gain control of the company certainly had an adverse effect on the
plaintiffs' right to vote. 9
The court in Belcher also considered whether the corporation
had allegedly suffered sufficient injury from the director's conduct
to warrant a derivative action. It noted that each count of the com-
plaint specifically alleged harm to the corporate entity due to the
defendants' fraud, bad faith, and gross abuse of discretion. The
court then discussed the statutory requirement' that an allegation
of a corporation's refusal to seek redress for the acts complained of
be included in the complaint. As demand on directors need not be
made if it would be useless,"' the court held that the statutory re-
quirement was met and that a derivative action was proper, since
plaintiffs alleged that a demand upon the corporation to remove
defendants from their position of corporate control would have been
futile because those same defendants were in control of the corpora-
tion.
The final case in the survey period dealing with derivative ac-
tions concerns a shareholder's right to maintain such a suit more
than three years after the corporation has been dissolved. Florida's
dissolution statute 2 permits a dissolved corporation to sue and be
sued in its corporate name during the 3-year period following its
dissolution. Thereafter, the corporation is barred from maintaining
an action.93 Since the plaintiff in a derivative action steps into the
shoes of the corporation of which he is a shareholder, 4 the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, properly concluded in Carothers v.
Patton5 that a shareholder cannot bring a derivative action where
his corporation is unable to sue in its own stead.
89. The Belcher court refused to follow Abbey Properties Co. v. Presidential Ins. Co.,
119 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960), where it was implied that if proxies which were properly
obtained were improperly voted or voted in excess of their authority, the only parties who
could complain were the shareholders who had given their proxies.
90. FLA. STAT. § 608.131(2) (1973). But see Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-250, § 50, creating FLA.
STAT. § 607.147 (1975), which no longer requires such an allegation.
91. Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932).
92. FLA. STAT. § 608.30 (1973). See also Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-250, §§ 86, 99, creating
FLA. STAT. §§ 607.261, .297 (1975). But note that under section 608.30, the liquidation of
corporate assets occurs during the three years following dissolution, while under section
607.261, corporate assets must be liquidated before the corporation is dissolved.
93. Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 222 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affd, 329 F.2d 424 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 835 (1964).
94. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
95. 288 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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9. STOCK CERTIFICATES
The stock certificate is the instrument which evidences the
shareholder's interest in the corporation. Such interest may exist
even though no stock certificate is issued." The stock certificate
merely serves to identify the shareholder and to facilitate the trans-
fer of his interest.
In Baywood Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Kennedy"7 the plaintiff
agreed to sell all of the outstanding stock of his closely-held corpora-
tion to the defendant. Even though the defendant took possession
and control of the company after the closing of the deal, "[flor
reasons not entirely clear, the stock certificates were not turned
over" 8 to the new owner. When the plaintiff, approximately three
years after the sale took place, foreclosed on the mortgage that he
had obtained as security for the defendant's promissory note, the
defendant claimed that it should be exonerated from its obligations
arising from the transaction because of the failure of the plaintiff
promptly to turn over the stock certificates. The court used a quasi-
estoppel analysis to deny defendant's claim, reasoning that defen-
dant was not hampered or prejudiced by reason of not having the
certificates. The decision in Baywood indicates that the court will
not permit a party to take advantage of a merely technical violation
of the law when he is not actually injured.
10. DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS
The Department of Citrus was created by the Florida legisla-
ture to carry out the provisions and requirements of the Florida
Citrus Code, Florida Statutes chapter 601.11 The Department is
empowered to act as a body corporate for all purposes necessary to
its statutory role.'"0
96. H. HFNN, supra note 10, § 134. Although FLA. STAT. § 608.41 (1973) states that every
shareholder shall be entitled to a stock certificate, it does not require that a corporation issue
such certificates unless a shareholder makes the appropriate request. See also Fla. Laws 1975,
ch. 75-250, § 23, creating FLA. STAT. § 607.067 (1975).
97. 295 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
98. Id. at 351.
99. FLA. STAT. § 20.29 (1973). Prior to the Governmental Reorganization Act of 1969
(Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-106), the major portion of the duties of the Department of Citrus was
carried out by the Florida Citrus Commission.
100. FLA. STAT. § 601.05 (1973). The legislature has authorized the creation of other
corporations for limited purposes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 374.011 (1973) (Florida Canal
Authority).
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The extent to which the Department is to be treated as a body
corporate was tested in State Department of Citrus v. Huff."" The
plaintiff, a former chairman of the Florida Citrus Commission
which exists within the Department of Citrus and which heads up
the Department, had incurred expenses in defending himself in a
criminal proceeding arising from certain acts that were allegedly
performed in his capacity as chairman. Plaintiff sued the Depart-
ment to recover these expenses under the statutory section"'2 which
provides that a corporate director shall be entitled to indemnifica-
tion of litigation expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by
him in the successful defense of a criminal action which arises out
of the director's corporate duties. Plaintiff's claim for relief was
denied by the District Court of Appeal, Second District. The court
failed to grant plaintiff's claim as a result of its twin findings that
the Department of Citrus' did not have full corporate powers and
that the plaintiff's claim under the indemnification statute did not
fall within the very narrowly defined purposes of the Department.
The decision in Huff seems overly restrictive, even though it is
supported by a prior Attorney General Opinion.'"3 The Department
of Citrus possesses "all the powers of a body corporate for all pur-
poses necessary for fully carrying out the provisions and require-
ments of this chapter."' 4 The Florida Citrus Commission is com-
posed of twelve people appointed by the governor and confirmed by
the senate, and they are required to faithfully carry out thier man-
dated function.'" 5 It would seem that the Florida citrus industry
would be benefited and protected if the members of the Florida
Citrus Commission knew that they would be indemnified for any
legal expenses incurred in the successful defense of a criminal pro-
ceeding arising from the member's official actions. For this reason,
the court in Huff should have found that the Department of Citrus,
although a limited body corporate, was required to indemnify plain-
tiff for his expenses.
101. 290 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 295 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1974).
102. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(14)(c) (1973). See also Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-250, § 5, creating
FLA. STAT. § 607.014(3) (1975).
103. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 068-44, [1967-68] FLA. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 234.
104. FLA. STAT. § 601.05 (1973).
105. FLA. STAT. § 601.04 (1973).
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II. SECURITIES REGULATION
A. New Legislation
The 1974 and 1975 sessions of the Florida legislature produced
two modifications to the Florida blue sky laws.106 First, the clause
within Florida Statutes section 517.21(1) (1973), which limited the
time in which an action could be brought for the recovery of the
purchase price of an unlawfully sold security to 2 years from the
date of such sale, was deleted. 07 The limitation period for actions
arising under the Florida blue sky laws is thus now governed by the
general statute of limitations.'"' The effect of the legislature's action
was to double the time in which an action can be brought under
Florida Statutes chapter 517, from 2 to 4 years.109
Second, statutory bond requirements for dealers registered to
sell securities in Florida were increased from $5,000 to $50,000, un-
less the dealer is a member of the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation, in which case no bond is required.""
B. Recent Decisions'
1. PERSONS LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF SECURITIES
Pursuant to Florida Statutes section 517.21(1) (Supp. 1974), a
purchaser of illegal securities in Florida may recover the purchase
price of such securities in an action against the officer of the unlaw-
fully created corporation if the officer has "personally participated
or aided in any way in making the sale. .... "I Although it is clear
that the quoted language refers to some activity by the officer in
inducing the purchaser to invest,"3 the limits of the activities which
106. FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1973).
107. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-382, § 28.
108. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (Supp. 1974).
109. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3) (Supp. 1974) provides for a 4-year statute of limitations for
an action founded on a statutory liability or any action not specifically provided for.
110. The change was made pursuant to Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-278. The title of the law
indicates that FLA. STAT. §§ 517.12, 517.13, 517.14 and 517.15 are to be changed to reflect
the increased amount. Unfortunately, the text of FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (Supp. 1974) still reflects
the prior amount of $5,000.
111. The highly significant case of Data Lease Financial Corp. v. Barad, 291 So. 2d 608
(Fla. 1974), in which the Supreme Court of Florida applied the blue sky laws to void a
transaction involving two closely held corporations, was reported and analyzed in Bell &
Goodman, Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 922, 944-46 (1974).
112. Emphasis added.
113. Nichols v. Yandre, 151 Fla. 87, 9 So. 2d 157 (1942).
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fall within the statutory scope have not been precisely drawn by the
courts.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, was presented
with an opportunity to further clarify these limits in Ruden v.
Medalie."4 Defendant, who was an attorney, was the secretary of a
corporation he had formed."' Defendant's signature appeared on
many of the corporation's debentures as an attesting witness to the
signature of the corporation's president. The plaintiff, an unsophis-
ticated investor, complained that the corporation's president had
exchanged with him some of the debentures, which were nonexempt
and unregistered,"' for $60,000-worth of blue chip securities; the
president was never seen again. Plaintiff, who had known the defen-
dant socially before the incident, instituted this action to rescind
her capital investment, alleging that she had relied upon defen-
dant's signature as an indication that the sale was in full compli-
ance with the law. The court in Ruden, placing heavy emphasis on
the fact that defendant neither knew of nor discussed plaintiff's
interest in investing in the corporation, held that
the defendant's mere act of signing nine debentures in blank as
an attesting witness and corporate secretary was [not] a legally
sufficient inducement to the plaintiff to hold defendant person-
ally liable."7
It was further stated that the plaintiff's
claim that she was persuaded to purchase the debentures by the
appearance of defendant's signature on nine of them should be
weighed against her own corresponding duty to exercise precau-
tion in safeguarding her own interest.""
The court's analysis appears to be faulty. First, in determining
114. 294 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
115. The defendant, who was inactive in the operation of the corporation, claimed that
he was initially listed as the secretary (and a director) of the corporation only to fulfill the
required number of positions for the company. In this regard, it might be noted that an
attorney cannot be held liable under FLA. STAT. § 517.21(l) (Supp. 1974) based upon his mere
filing of the necessary documents with the Secretary of State to form a corporation. Hughes
v. Bie, 183 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
116. Defendant testified that he had cautioned the corporation's president as to the
registration requirements of Florida's blue sky laws, but was unaware that the debentures
were not registered. Defendant stated that the corporation's president had informed him that
he had another attorney in Boston who could handle his affairs. 294 So. 2d at 405.
117. 294 So. 2d at 406.
118. Id. The plaintiff admitted that, being an inexperienced investor, she did not investi-
gate the books and records of the corporation nor the value of the debentures before investing.
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that an officer's signature on an illegal security does not constitute
"some activity" under section 517.21(1), the court not only went
against authority from other jurisdictions decided under similar
statutes,"9 but also ignored the public policy consideration that an
officer of a corporation should be responsible for the documents he
signs. 2" If officers of a corporation are under a duty to exercise due
diligence attesting to debentures, there would arguably exist tighter
controls on the possibilities of fraud. Second, the court, in effect,
used an estoppel analysis when it determined that plaintiff should
not be able to rely on defendant's signature as a result of her failure
to investigate fully the corporation's track record. It seems that the
plaintiff was held to an excessive duty in light of the fact that
[estoppel under Florida law requires that the stock purchaser
directly participate in the management of the issuing corporation
or otherwise exercise some control over the corporation. 2'
Interpretation of section 517.21 was also involved in Frye v.
Platinum Coast Aviation, Inc.'22 Plaintiff brought an action against
a salesman, a dealer, and a surety'23 under the above statute, pre-
senting the question of whether a dealer and a surety are liable to a
purchaser of nonexempt, unregistered securities which were sold by
one of the dealer's salesmen without knowledge and without author-
ization of the dealer. The court in Frye responded in the negative,
apparently relying on the common law rule of agency that principals
are not liable for the actions of their agents outside the scope of
employment."'
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, arrived at a con-
clusion which is arguably wrong as to both the bondsman and the
dealer. First, any person having a right of action against a dealer or
salesman under section 517.21(1) also has a right of action"'2 under
the bond which is posted pursaunt to Florida Statutes section 517.12
119. See Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 588, 605-07 (1972).
120. Cf. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
121. Henderson v. Hayden, Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 1972). In this case,
a sophisticated investor who entered into a contract for the purchase of unregistered stock,
knowing that the stock was unregistered, was not estopped from obtaining rescission under
FLA. STAT. § 517.21(1) (1971). Contra, Sorenson v. Elrod, 286 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1960).
122. 298 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974). This case was handed down without a majority
opinion but with an excellent dissenting opinion.
123. A statutory bond requirement is set out in FLA. STAT. § 517.12(4) (1973).
124. W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 87 (1964).
125. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 517.21(2) (Supp. 1974).
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(Supp. 1974). Since the trial court agreed that the plaintiff had a
right of action against the salesman, it is impossible to comprehend
why, under section 517.21(2), the plaintiff did not have a right of
action under the bond against the surety. 
1 2
6
Second, the facts of the case seemingly support an application
of the well-established rule of agency law that a principal is liable
for misrepresentations made by an agent during the course of trans-
actions apparently authorized if the agent's position made the de-
ceit possible.'27
Third, one must agree with the dissenting judge in Frye who,
concluding that the paramount concern of the blue sky laws is the
protection of purchasers and the condemnation of illegal sales of
securities, believed that the legislature intended to place the burden
and responsibility for all illegal sales upon those registered under its
laws as dealers. Protection of the investor will be eroded if he cannot
be confident that his purchase of securities from a registered sales-
man is in full complaince with the law. The court's decision in Frye
thus appears to violate both the letter and the spirit of Florida's blue
sky laws.
2. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The federal securities laws contain no limitation period that is
expressly applicable to claims arising under rule 10b-5,'25 nor does
federal law provide any general statute of limitations for civil ac-
tions. Consequently, the limitation period applied by a federal court
is that which the forum state applies to the state remedy which
bears the closest substantive resemblance to rule 10b-5 and which
best effectuates its purpose.' 9
There are two causes of action in Florida which bear a resembl-
ance to rule 10b-5-common law fraud and Florida Statutes section
517.301(1) (1973), which deals with fraudulent securities transac-
tions. In Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc.':"' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit therefore had to choose
126. 298 So. 2d at 523 n.6 (Walden, J., dissenting).
127. W. SEAVEY, supra note 124, § 92.
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
129. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
130. 499 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). The same question
was presented in the companion case of O'Connell v. Economic Research Analyst, Inc., 499
F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
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between the then existing 3-year limitation period for common law
fraud' and a 2-year limitation for an action under section
517.301(1).32 The court examined both alternatives and concluded
that the policies underlying rule 10b-5 are more nearly embodied in
section 517.301(1) and therefore applied the shorter limitation pe-
riod.
The court's decision seems to be based upon a sound analysis
of the federal and state rules applying to the fraudulent sale of
securities. Not only is the language of rule 10b-5 strikingly similar
to that of section 517.301(1), but the interpretation of the Florida
blue sky provision has paralleled the development of rule lOb-5."':1:
Indeed, section 517.301(1) has been referred to as "the mirror
image" of rule 10b-5.'1
3. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Two minor criminal prosecution cases under Florida's blue sky
laws occurred during the survey period. In the first case, "35 the defen-
dant claimed that it was not illegal for him to sell securities without
being registered as a broker or dealer as required under Florida
Statutes section 517.12(1) (1973) because the sales were to nonresi-
dents of the State of Florida. The court quickly dismissed this argu-
ment, as the applicable statute prohibits all sales of securities
within Florida without regard to the residence of the purchaser.
In the companion case, ' the defendant was prosecuted for the
delivery of securities to a bank without being registered as a broker
or dealer. The court rejected the state's contention that in order to
qualify for an exempt transaction under Florida Statutes section
517.06(5) (1973), one must sell securities to a bank, in the bank's
131. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(5)(d) (1973). A 4-year limitation period for common law fraud
actions is now provided for by FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(j) (Supp. 1974).
132. Since the time of the Hudak and O'Connell cases, the statute of limitation for
actions arising out of blue sky laws violations has been changed to 4 years. See notes 107-09
supra and accompanying text.
133. Whereas the common law action for fraud requires a false statement of fact known
by the defendant to be false at the time it was made, Poliakoff v. National Emblem Ins. Co.,
249 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), the Florida courts have relaxed such traditional notions
of scienter and evil purpose in actions brought under its blue sky laws. State v. Houghtaling,
181 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1965).
134. Comment, Opening a Pandora's Box - Disclosure Under the Florida Securities Act,
23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 593, 594 (1973).
135. State v. Hayes, 305 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
136. State v. Hayes, 305 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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name and for the bank's use. Since the statute expressly exempts
"the . . . transfer or delivery of securities to a bank . . . ,"' the
court correctly sustained the lower court's dismissal of the informa-
tion against the defendant.
4. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE
The Department of Banking and Finance administers and pro-
vides for the enforcement of all the provisions of Florida's blue sky
laws ':" and is empowered to enjoin the unlawful sale of securities.' :"
In Wee Mac Corp. v. State4" the Department attempted to seek
recovery of the purchase price of illegally sold securities on behalf
of the private purchasers. The court refused to grant the Depart-
ment such power, finding that nothing in Florida Statutes chapter
517 authorizes it to do so. It was pointed out that
[tihe wisdom of this decision of the legislature is evident since
the private purchasers are not parties to this suit and therefore
have not been heard upon the business decision involved."'
The court was certainly justified in not permitting the Depart-
ment of Banking and Finance to utilize section 517.21 to recover the
purchase price of securities sold in violation of the Act since it is
clear from even a cursory reading of the statute that this right of
recovery belongs solely to the purchaser.
137. FLA. SrAT. § 517.06(5) (1973).
138. FLA. STAr. § 517.03 (1973).
139. FLA. STAT. § 517.19 (1973).
140. 301 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
141. Id. at 102.
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